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When asked to explain their beliefs about a concept, some children produce 
gestures that convey different information from the information conveyed in their 
speech (i.e., gesture-speech mismatches). Moreover, it is precisely the children 
who produce a large proportion of gesture-speech mismatches in their explana- 
tions of a concept who are particularly “ready” to benefit from instruction in that 
concept, and thus may be considered to be in a transitional state with respect to 
the concept. Church and Goldin-Meadow (1986) and Perry, Church and Coldin- 
Meadow (1988) studied this phenomenon with respect to two different concepts at 
two different ages and found that gesture-speech mismatch reliability predicts 
readiness to learn in both domains. In an attempt to test further the generality of 
gesture-speech mismatch as an index of transitional knowledge, Stone, Webb, 
and Mahootian (1991) explored this phenomenon in a group of IS-year-olds work- 
ing on a problem-solving task. On this task, however, gesture-speech mismatch 
was not found to predict transitional knowledge. We present here a theoretical 
framework, which makes it clear why we expect gesture-speech mismatch to be a 
genera/ index of transitional knowledge, and then use this framework to motivate 
our methodological practices for establishing gesture-speech mismatch as a pre- 
dictor of transitional knowledge. Finally, we present evidence suggesting that, if 
these practices had been used by Stone et al., they too would have found that 
gesture-speech mismatch predicts transitional knowledge. 
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Traditionally, the aim of developmental psychologists has been to describe the 
stages through which children progress as they acquire new concepts. In- 
creasingly. however, researchers in both developmental and cognitive psycholo- 
gy have begun to focus on characterizing the mental transition that occurs when 
new concepts are acquired, and describing the mechanisms responsible for tran- 
sitions of this sort (e.g., Stemberg, 1984). 
We have suggested that the relationship between gesture and speech may be a 
useful tool in characterizing the stability of knowledge states and in predicting 
the transitions between them. We have discovered that, when asked to explain 
their beliefs about a concept, some children produce gestures that convey differ- 
ent information from the information conveyed in their speech (i.e., gesture- 
speech mismatches). These children thus appear to be expressing two different 
notions with respect to a single concept-one conveyed in speech and one 
conveyed in gesture. We have shown that those children who produce a large 
proportion of gesture-speech mismatches in their explanations of a concept 
(children whom we call “discordant”) are more likely to benefit from instruction 
in that concept than the children who produce few gesture-speech mismatches 
(children whom we call “concordant”). We have studied this phenomenon with 
respect to two different concepts at two different ages [conservation in 5- to 8- 
year-olds (Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986) and mathematical equivalence in 9- 
to lo-year-olds (Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988)] and have found, in 
both domains, that gesture-speech mismatch reliably predicts readiness to learn. 
Thus, children who are discordant with respect to a particular concept appear to 
be “ready” to profit from instruction in that concept and, in this sense, can be 
said to be in a transitional state in their acquisition of the concept. 
Moreover, we have shown that the discordant state is transitional, not only in 
terms of readiness to learn, but also in the sense that it is both preceded and 
followed by a concordant state. Wagner, Scott, Church, and Goldin-Meadow 
(1990), for example, showed that children began their acquisition of mathe- 
matical equivalence in a concordant state (albeit an incorrect one), then pro- 
ceeded through a period of discordance, and finally returned to a concordant (and 
correct) state. In addition, we have shown that there is a cost to being in transi- 
tion. Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, and Garber (1991) reported that children who 
are in transition with respect to mathematical equivalence (discordant children) 
expend more cognitive effort when solving addition problems instantiating that 
concept than children who are not in transition (concordant children) and, as a 
result, are less capable of simultaneously performing an unrelated word-recall 
task. We suggest that this increased cognitive cost arises because the discordant 
children activate, and maintain in working memory, both of the notions found in 
their mismatched explanations when they solve each of the addition problems. 
In an attempt to test the generality of gesture-speech mismatch as an index of 
transitional knowledge, Stone, Webb, and Mahootian (1991) have explored this 
phenomenon in a group of 1.5year-olds working on a problem-solving task 
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involving multiple causal factors (a modification of Inhelder and Piaget’s bend- 
ing rods task). Confimling our previous studies, Stone et al. found, first, that the 
adolescent children, when asked to explain their responses on the task, routinely 
produced iconic gestures along with their speech. In addition, Stone et al. found 
that these gestures could be reliably coded (even when coded with the sound 
turned off), and conveyed substantive information about the task. Finally, Stone 
et al. found that gesture-speech mismatch was quite common, occurring roughly 
as often as in our own data. 
As Stone et al. themselves pointed out, there is no doubt that gesture-speech 
mismatch exists. It clearly does, even in these older children acquiring a rela- 
tively abstract concept. The question, however, is what gesture-speech mis- 
match reflects and whether its usefulness as an index of transitional knowledge is 
restricted, either to a small set of concepts or to a narrow range of ages. Stone et 
al. reported that gesture-speech mismatch did not accurately predict transition in 
their data, and therefore argued that the measure’s usefulness is not as general as 
we have hypothesized. However, before accepting the limitations of the gesture- 
speech mismatch index, we need to ask whether Stone et al.‘s study replicates the 
original studies in all aspects. In fact, three components of the Stone et al. study 
differ from the original studies. 
1. Gesture-Speech Mismatch as an Index of Transitional 
Knowledge: More Than One Notion in a Single Explanation 
Calculating the Frequency of Gesture-Speech Mismatch. Stone et al. 
used a different procedure from ours to assess the frequency of gesture-speech 
mismatch and to divide children into concordant and discordant groups.’ The 
primary difference is that Stone et al. excluded from their calculations all re- 
sponses in which the child either produced no gestures or produced nonreferen- 
tial gestures (e.g., batonlike movements that convey no substantive information). 
We included these responses and offer the following theoretical reason for so 
doing. 
We hypothesize that what characterizes a child in transition with respect to a 
particular concept is the fact that the child simultaneously activates more than 
one notion when considering that concept. We are not unique in putting forth this 
t Although Stonr et al. used a different procedure from ours to calculate the frequency of 
gesture-speech mismatch, they used the same procedure we did to establish a gestural lexicon. In 
particular, they detemtined. in a pilot sample, which gestures routinely accompanied different spoken 
responses, and took the gesture that most frequently accompanied a particular spoken response to be a 
lexical match for that response. They then used this lexicon to code the responses of the children in 
their study, coding gesture with the sound turned off and speech with the picture turned off, as we did 
in our studies. The fact that such a gestunl lexicon can be established is a testament, both to the 
meticulous and insightful coding perfomtcd by Stone et al., and to the systematicity that underlies the 
gestures individuals produce along with their speech (cf. McNeill, 1992). 
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hypothesis. Virtually any theory that posits internal conflict as a mechanism of 
developmental change assumes that children must, at some level, simultaneously 
consider and compare the notions they have available in order for discrepancies 
among those notions to be detected and serve as a catalyst for change (e.g., Keil, 
1984; Klahr, 1984; Piaget, 1975/1985). Discordant children exhibit this simul- 
taneous activation of more than one notion quite directly in their explanations- 
conveying one notion in speech and a second notion in gesture.’ Moreover, we 
have shown that this simultaneous activation of more than one notion is evident, 
not only in discordant children’s explanations of a concept, but also in their 
solutions to problems instantiating that concept (Goldin-Meadow et al., 1991). 
Given that the production of more than one notion characterizes a child in 
transition, it follows that the production of a single notion ought to characterize 
the child in a nontransitional state, whether that single notion is produced in both 
gesture and speech, or in speech alone. By eliminating all of the responses 
without gesture, as well as those containing nonreferential gestures (which do not 
reflect substantive notions), Stone et al. have eliminated a large number of the 
single-notion responses. As a result, their procedure inevitably inflates the pro- 
portion of a child’s gesture-speech mismatches, and may provide an inaccurate 
assessment of the relative number of dual-notion responses the child produces- 
the defining characteristic of discordant versus concordant children. Indeed, 
Stone et al. did find a higher proportion of discordant children (53%) than did 
Perry et al. (35%) or Church and Goldin-Meadow (46%), suggesting that Stone 
et al. may have misclassified as discordant some children who would otherwise 
have been considered concordant. 
A Proposed Reanalysis of the Stone et al. Data. There is, in fact, some 
suggestion that recalculating the frequency of gesture-speech mismatch to in- 
clude no-gesture and nonreferential gesture responses would alter the results in 
the Stone et al. study. Stone et al. divided the children in their study into three 
groups: spontaneous users who performed well on the task both before and after 
an intervening training activity, transitional children who performed well on the 
task after training but not before,3 and nonusers who performed poorly on the 
2 We do not mean to suggest that the discordant representations in gesture and speech are 
themselves catalysts for change, but rather that the discordance reflects some discrepancy in the 
child’s representations of the concept, a discrepancy that must be resolved in order for change to 
OCCUT. 
s Stone et al. also included in their transitional group one child who succeeded on the task before 
training but failed on the task after training. We would not have considered such a child to be 
transitional simply because the standard we use to validate gesture-speech mismatch as an index of 
transitional knowledge is readiness to learn, and this child had not demonstrated that he or she was 
ready to learn the concept; see Beilin (1965), Brdinerd (1972). Langer and Strauss (1972). Murray 
(1974). Strauss and Langer (1970). and Strauss and Rimalt (1974) who similarly use receptivity to 
instruction as the defining characteristic of transitional knowledge. 
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task both before and after training. They predicted that the spontaneous users 
(assumed to be stable in their mastery of the concept) and the nonusers (assumed 
to be stable in their lack of mastery of the concept) would produce fewer gesture- 
speech mismatches before training than the transitional children (assumed to be 
on the verge of learning the concept). 
Stone et al. found that the spontaneous users produced gesture-speech mis- 
matches on 32.4% of their tests, which contained both gesture and speech prior 
to training, a percentage that was not significantly different from the percentage 
produced by either the transitional children or the nonusers. It is important to 
note, however, that the spontaneous users produced significantly more tests 
without gesture or with nonreferential gestures than the transitional children or 
the nonusers. If these tests are included in the denominator when the percentage 
of tests containing gesture-speech mismatch is calculated, it follows that the 
percentage of gesture-speech mismatch would decrease for the spontaneous 
users, but not for the transitional children or the nonusers-an outcome that 
might result in spontaneous users having significantly fewer tests with gesture- 
speech mismatch than the transitional children or the nonusers. Thus, recalculat- 
ing the frequency of gesture-speech mismatch to include no-gesture and non- 
referential gesture responses would lead to an outcome more in line with the 
predictions Stone et al. made on the basis of our original studies (note, however, 
that our theory predicts that the nonusers should also produce fewer gesture- 
speech mismatches than the transitional children; we return to this discrepancy in 
Section 2 on type of training). 
A Reanalysis of the Perry et al. Data. A second argument that supports our 
claim that the way in which gesture-speech mismatch is calculated is pivotal to 
exploring the question of transition comes from a reanalysis of our own data. If 
we recalculate the frequency of gesture-speech mismatch ignoring those re- 
sponses that did not contain gesture (i.e., using the procedure Stone et al. used),4 
the pattern of results obtained look very much like those presented in Stone et al. 
Table 1 (p. 114) presents the proportion of children in Perry et al. who acquired 
the concept of mathematical equivalence after training (i.e., those who SUC- 
ceeded on both the addition posttest and the multiplication generalization test) as 
a function of the child’s concordance or discordance status on the pretest. Con- 
cordance and discordance were calculated twice: once as in the original Perry et 
al. study, including all responses (even those without gesture), and a second time 
as in Stone et al., excluding responses that did not contain gesture. To understand 
4 Nonreferential gestures were not coded in either Church and Goldin-Meadow (1986) or Perry et 
al. (1988). As a result, if a verbal response had occurred with a nonreferential gesture but with no 
other gesture, it would have been considered a speech-alone response in the original analyses, and 
therefore would have been automatically eliminated along with the other speech-alone responses in 
the reanalyses following the Stone et al. procedure in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 1. Proportion of Concordant and Discordant Children 
Succeeding on the Generalization Test After Training 
Proportion of Children Succeeding Concordant 
on the Generalization Test (n) 
Discordant a 
(n) 
If Concordance and Discordance are Calculated: 
I. As in Perry et al., i.e.. including 
all explanations .25 (24)h 
2. As in Stone CI al.. i.e., including 
only those explanations contain- 
ing both gesture and speech .38 (13) 
.62 (I.l)* 
.s3 (17) 
Toncordant children wcn‘ defined as those who produced gcstum-speech 
mismatches on fewer than 50% of the countable explanations they produced on 
the pretest (i.e.. all of the explanations they produced for the Perry et al. 
analyses, and the gesture + speech explanations they produced for the Stone 
et al. analysts). Discordant children were defined as those who produced 
gesture-speech mismatches on 50% or more of the countable explanations 
they produced on the pretest. 
Vhe number in parentheses represents the total number of concordant 
children or discordant children contributing data IO each analysis. The reason 
that the number of subjects differs for the Perry ct al. and the Stone et al. 
analyses is because 7 of the children in the study produced no gestures at all. 
Because Stone et al. considered only those responses that contained both 
gesture and speech as part of the data base, these children provided no data for 
the Stone et al. analysis. In contrast, because Perry ct al. included all IV- 
sponscs--even those without gcsturc-as part of the data base. these 7 sub- 
jects can bc included in the Perry ct al. analysis. Following the Pcrq et al. 
procedures, the 7 children would be classified as concordant because fewer 
than 50% (in fact, none) of their 6 explanations contained gesture-speech 
mismatch (i.e., all of their responses contained a single notion). It is worth 
noting that if these 7 children werr included as concordant in the Stone et al. 
calculations, the proportion of children succeeding on the generalization test 
would still not be significantly different for the concordant and discordant 
children. 
*p < .05. 
the effect of such a recalculation, consider a child who produced two gesture- 
speech mismatches, one gesture-speech match, and three speech-alone re- 
sponses in his six explanations on the pretest. Following Perry et al., the child 
would be considered concordant: He produced two mismatches out of his six 
responses, that is, 33% of his responses are mismatches, a percentage lower than 
the 50% needed to be classified as discordant. However, following Stone et al., 
the same child would be considered discordant: He produced two mismatches out 
of three responses (only those containing gesture count toward the denominator), 
that is, 67% of his responses are mismatches, a percentage greater than the 50% 
needed to be classified as discordant. 
We have hypothesized that children who are discordant with respect to a 
concept are more likely to benefit from instruction in that concept than children 
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Table 2. Average Proportion of Explanations Containing 
a Gesture-Speech Mismatch Produced by Transitional 
and Nontransitional Children on the Pretest 




M (SD) M (SD) 
If the Total Number of Explanations is Calculated: 
1. As in Perry et al., i.e., in- 
cluding all explanations .25 (29) 
2. As in Stone et al.. i.e., in- 
cluding only those explana- 
tions containing both gesture 
and speech .46 (.36) 
.42 (.26)* 
so (.30) 
UNontransitional children were defined as those who did not succeed on the 
generalization test after training. Transitional children were defined as those 
who did succeed on the generalization test after training. 
*p < .05. 
who are concordant. Note, however, that in Table 1 this prediction is confirmed 
only ifthe frequency of gesture-speech mismatch is calculated on the basis of all 
of the child’s responses, even those without gesture. That is, discordant children 
are more likely to succeed on the generalization test than concordant children 
only if discordance is calculated according to Perry et al. [x’(l) = 4.79, p = 
.03], and not if discordance is calculated according to Stone et al. [x2( 1) = .62, 
p = .43].” 
In their study, Stone et al. also looked at the relationship between gesture- 
speech mismatch and transitional status by dividing children into transitional and 
nontransitional groups and calculating the average proportion of gesture-speech 
mismatches the groups produced. Following the line of reasoning developed in 
our studies, they predicted that the transitional children would produce more 
gesture-speech mismatches prior to training than the nontransitional children 
(although they found no evidence for this prediction in their data). Table 2 
presents a reanalysis of the Perry et al. data dividing the children into a transi- 
tional group (those who succeeded on the generalization test after training) and a 
nontransitional group (those who failed the generalization test after training), and 
s It is interesting to note that when we consider only the children in Stone et al.‘s study who did 
nor know the concept at the beginning of the study (i.e. the nonusers and the transitional children), we 
find that the proportion of discordant childrrn who succeeded on the task after training was, in fact, 
slightly but not significantly higher than the proportion of concordant children: .53 (‘YIP) versus .44 
(%b) when calculated following Stone et al.‘s procedure. This difference is comparable to the slight 
difference seen in Table I when the Perry et al. data are analyzed according to the Stone et al. 
procedure: .53 (‘VII,) versus .38 (%j). 
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calculating the mean proportion of responses containing gesture-speech mis- 
matches each group produced prior to training. We have calculated the mean 
proportion of responses containing gesture-speech mismatch twice: once follow- 
ing the procedure used in Perry et al., including all responses (even those without 
gesture). and a second time following the procedure used in Stone et al., exclud- 
ing responses that did not contain gesture. As Stone et al. would predict, transi- 
tional children produced significantly more gesture-speech mismatches than 
nontransitional children. However, this prediction is confimled only if the fre- 
quency of gesture-speech mismatch is calculated according to the procedure 
used in our original studies [t(35) = I .7l, p < .05], and not if the frequency is 
calculated according to the procedure used in Stone et al. [Q28) = .32, p = 
.37].” 
In sum, we have argued on theoretical grounds that all of a child’s re- 
sponses-those without gesture as well as those with gesture-ought to be 
included when the frequency of gesture-speech mismatch is calculated. We 
argue specifically that no-gesture responses, by definition, reflect the use of a 
single notion (expressed only in speech) and thus contrast in an important way 
with responses in which gesture-speech mismatch reflects the use of more than 
one notion. Next, we have presented empirical evidence suggesting that, if Stone 
et al. had included no-gesture responses (and responses with nonreferential ges- 
tures) in their own data base, they would have been more likely to find the 
relationship between gesture-speech mismatch and transitional knowledge pre- 
dicted by our hypothesis. Finally, we have presented a reanalysis of our own data 
showing that if we use Stone et al.‘s procedure for calculating gesture-speech 
mismatch, we also can find no relationship between gesture-speech mismatch 
and transitional knowledge. 
2. Validating Gesture-Speech Mismatch as an Index of Transitional 
Knowledge: The Importance of the Type of Training Used 
to Identify Children in Transition 
As previously described, recalculating the frequency of gesture-speech mis- 
match in the Stone et al. data to include those tests that contained no gestures or 
nonreferential gestures is likely to result in the spontaneous users producing 
fewer gesture-speech mismatches than either the transitional children or the 
nonusers. However, because the nonusers produced approximately the same 
number of tests without gesture or with nonreferential gesture as the transitional 
children, a recalculation is not likely to result in the nonusers and transitional 
6 The number of subjects used for these two nnalyscs differs because 7 of the subjects in the Perry 
et al. study did not gesture at nil. Becnusc Stone et al. considetcd only those responses that contain 
both gesture und speech as part of the dntn base, these children provide no data for the Stone et al. 
annlyses. in contrast. because Perry et al. included all responses, even those without gesture in the 
dutn base, these 7 subjects cun bc included in this analysis. 
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children having different proportions of tests containing gesture-speech mis- 
match. According to our theory, we would have expected the transitional children 
(who are presumed to be on the verge of learning the concept) to produce 
gesture-speech mismatch more frequently than the nonusers (who are presumed 
to be stable in their ignorance of the concept). However, this prediction depends 
heavily on whether Stone et al. used a training procedure to stimulate learning 
that is adequate for truly discriminating transitional from nontransitional 
children. 
It is our belief that, to be considered in transition, a child must be able to 
respond to instruction by demonstrating more than rote or superficial learning. 
Indeed, we have proposed gesture-speech mismatch as a technique for identify- 
ing precisely those children who are capable of demonstrating qualitative (as 
opposed to superficial) shifts in their understanding of a concept. We have thus 
argued that discordant children are particularly ready to profit from instruction in 
a concept, and experience a qualitative change in their understanding of the 
concept, as a result of that instruction. 
It is important to realize that we are not arguing that discordant children are 
more susceptible than concordant children to any kind of instruction-only to the 
type of instruction that leads to qualitative change. Thus, certain kinds of training 
would not be expected to have differential effects on discordant and concordant 
children (e.g., training that improves performance on the same task but does not 
provide skills that can be generalized; see Hiebert & Lefevre, 1986), and would 
consequently not be adequate for identifying transitional versus nontransitional 
children. 
For example, our previous work has shown that discordant children are no more 
likely to progress on the mathematical equivalence task than concordant children 
when given training in a procedlrre for solving addition equivalence problems. 
Figure 1 (A) ( p. 118) presents the proportion of concordant and discordant children 
who showed no success, success on only the posttest, or success on both the 
posttest and the generalization test after procedure training (data from Perry, 
1987/ 1988). Procedure training did not distinguish between concordant and dis- 
cordant children-both groups made approximately the same amount of progress 
on the posttest, which contained the same type of addition problems as in the 
pretest [x’( I) = .83, p = .36], and both groups made essentially no progress on 
the generalization test, which required that the children extend the knowledge 
gained during training to a different type of problem [x’(l) = 1.37, p = .24]. 
In contrast, training in the principle underlying mathematical equivalence did 
lead to success on the multiplication generalization test and, moreover, did have 
a differential effect on discordant and concordant children. Figure l(B) (p. 118) 
presents the proportion of concordant and discordant children who showed no 
success, success on only the posttest, or success on both the posttest and the 
generalization test after principle training (data from Perry et al., 1988). Unlike 
procedure training, principle training had different effects on the two groups, 
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Figure 1. The proportion of concordant and discordant children who showed no 
success, success on only the posttest, or success on both the posttest and the gener- 
alization test under two different training conditions: (A) after training in a pro- 
cedure for solving addition equivalence problems, or (B) after training in the 
principle underlying mathematical equivalence. Note that procedure training for the 
most part does not lead to success on the generalization test and does nof distinguish 
between concordant and discordant children. In contrast, principle training does 
both. 
stimulating the discordant children to do significantly better on the generalization 
test than the concordant children [x2( 1) = 4.79, p = .03]. Thus, performance 
after principle training could serve as the basis upon which to identify children in 
transition, but performance after procedure training could not. The crucial ques- 
tion is whether the type of training Stone et al. used in their study was adequate 
to identify children in transition. 
Stone et al. chose the training for their study from one of several types of 
interventions shown by Day and Stone (1982) to improve performance in some 
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children from one trial of a control-of-variables task to a second trial of the same 
task. Stone et al. asked children to decide which of two pairs of rods would 
provide a better way to identify the variables causing the rod to bend (where one 
of the pairs was a confounded test and the other an unconfounded test). Stone et 
al. provided no evidence that this type of training is sufficient to lead to a general 
understanding of how to isolate variables, even for a child who is in transition 
with respect to this concept; that is, the training may make evident the contrast 
between confounded and unconfounded tests for the bending rods task but not for 
other, conceptually related tasks (e.g., testing which combinations of chemicals 
produce a yellow liquid).7 If so, this training would not identify as ready to learn 
children who are capable of making qualitative shifts in their understanding of 
the concept (viz. discordant children under procedure training) and therefore, we 
would argue, should not have been used to attempt to discriminate transitional 
from nontransitional children. 
3. The Relationship Between Changing Knowledge and Discordance: 
The Path of Acquisition 
The final point we emphasize is that, in our view, the discordant state is transi- 
tional in the sense that it is both preceded and followed by a concordant state; that 
is, when children acquire a concept, they are first concordant (although incor- 
rect), then discordant, and finally again concordant (and correct) with respect to 
that concept. The two concordant states are comparable in the sense that children 
in both of these states ought to produce few gesture-speech mismatches (i.e., 
primarily single-notion explanations). However, it is crucial to realize that, al- 
though the children in the two concordant states are both hypothesized to be 
stable in their knowledge of the concept, the level of their knowledge is expected 
to differ markedly. In particular, children in the concordant state that precedes 
discordance, although stable, are stable in their luck of understanding of the 
concept; in contrast, children in the concordant state following discordance are 
stable in their mastery of the concept. 
This point is particularly relevant to the analyses Stone et al. presented in their 
Table 3 where they examined the children’s judgments of whether a test was 
7 Day and Stone (1982) did attempt to examine the children’s ability to generalize the knowledge 
gained during intervention to a differcnr control-of-variables task (the pendulums task), and showed 
that generalization of this sort did occur. However, they did not present the generalization data as a 
function of type of Intervention. Thus, one cannot tell from the data presented in Day and Stone 
whether the type of training Stone et al. chose to use in their study was one of the interventions that 
led to generalization. Moreover, because Day and Stone did not include a pretest measure on the 
pendulums task, and because there is no a priori reason to believe that the bending rods task ought to 
be mastered before the pendulums task, it is difftcult to tell if the children who did well on the 
pendulums generalization task did so because of what they learned during training, or because they 
knew how to do the task before the experiment began. 
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confounded, and their justifications for those judgments. In this table, Stone et 
al. contrasted concordant and discordant children, but they included in their 
sample of concordant children those children who were spontaneous users (i.e., 
those who knew the task before training and were likely to have been in the 
concordant state that follows discordance), as well as those children who were 
nonusers (i.e., those who did not improve on the task even superficially after 
training and were likely to have been in the concordant state that precedes 
discordance). These two types of concordant children need to be distinguished 
and separated in analyses of this type precisely because we would predict that 
children in the concordant state following discordance ought to perform better 
than children in the concordant state preceding discordance. 
It is worth pointing out that the children in our training studies were selected 
because they failed the pretest; thus, the only type of concordant child in our 
studies was the child in the concordant state preceding discordance. We did, 
however, find in the Perry et al. study that, after training, approximately one 
third of the children who were discordant on the pretest became concordant but at 
the higher, equivalence level (see Table 5 in Perry et al.). We have, in addition, 
gathered further evidence in support of the path children are hypothesized to 
follow when acquiring mathematical equivalence. In an extended training study, 
Wagner et al. (1990) instructed children in mathematical equivalence and ob- 
served their explanations throughout the training period. As the children acquired 
the concept of mathematical equivalence, they progressed through a series of 
steps: They began acquisition in a concordant state at a nonequivalence level, 
then proceeded through a period of discordance, and finally returned to a concor- 
dant state but at a higher, equivalence level. These data add credence to the 
hypothesis that the discordant state is transitional, not only in terms of readiness 
to learn, but also in the sense that it is both preceded and followed by a concor- 
dant state. 
Summary 
The data presented by Stone et al., taken in conjunction with our own, make it 
clear that gesture-speech mismatch exists. Indeed, gesture-speech mismatch 
appears to be relatively common in different age groups acquiring different 
concepts. The question, however, is whether gesture-speech mismatch is a 
reliable index of transitional knowledge for individuals of any age acquiring a 
variety of concepts. 
We have provided a theoretical framework that allows us to understand why 
gesture-speech mismatch, reflecting the use of dual notions, might well be a 
general index of transitional knowledge, and we have argued for methodological 
practices in accord with this theoretical position. If these practices are used, 
gesture-speech mismatch is a reliable predictor of transitional knowledge in at 
least two concepts acquired at two different ages. In this context, we point to 
evidence from a laboratory other than our own suggesting that gesture-speech 
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mismatch is also a reliable predictor of readiness to learn in very young children 
acquiring words. Gershkoff-Stowe and Smith (1991) showed that children rang- 
ing in age from 16 to 22 months produced a relatively large proportion of 
gesture-speech mismatches (i.e., pointing-naming errors for known words, 
such as pointing at a cow while saying “dog” at a time when dog was a reliably 
known word) during the period when they were experiencing a “naming explo- 
sion” and were particularly ready to add new words to their lexicons. 
Finally, we argue that if these practices were to be used by Stone et al., that is, 
if attention were paid to the child’s production of single-notion as well as dual- 
notion responses, and if care were taken to use a training procedure that induces 
qualitative change to identify children who are in transition, it might well turn 
out that gesture-speech mismatch would signal readiness to learn in their data as 
it did in our own and Gershkoff-Stowe and Smiths. If not, the interesting 
question to ask is why gesture-speech mismatch reflects transitional knowledge 
in some concepts and not in others-and, equally important, what it is that 
gesture-speech mismatch does reflect in these other concepts. 
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